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CLOSING THE “POLITICAL ACTION
COMMITTEE LOOPHOLE”: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROHIBITIONS ON
PAC TO PAC DONATIONS
Michael C. Peretz*
The 2020 election cycle is now officially in full-swing. Over
the next year, President Donald J. Trump and the various
Democratic candidates seeking their party’s nomination for
President will crisscross the country to gain voter support in the
form

of

votes

and

campaign

contributions.

Meanwhile,

Congressional and Senatorial candidates will increasingly spend
more time in their districts and states to meet with voters and raise
funds to fend off serious challengers. If recent history repeats itself,
these candidates will collectively raise billions of dollars for their
campaigns.1 While the media will undoubtedly report on the
amount of dollars raised by many of these candidates—an
important measure to determine the viability of any campaign for
federal office—these reports will not accurately reflect the true
strength of these organizations unless they also account for

* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2020, University of North Carolina School of
Law; Managing Editor, First Amendment Law Review.
1
Madi Alexander, PACs Made Up Nearly Half of 2016 Election Spending,
BLOOMBERG LAW, Apr. 18, 2017, https://www.bna.com/pacs-madenearly-n57982086803/.
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expenditures made by Political Action Committees2 (“PACs”) in
support of each of these candidates.
During the two most recent election cycles,3 PACs received
and spent a record amount of campaign contributions.4 For
instance, during the 2016 general election cycle, expenditures
made by PACs5 “made up a forty-six percent share of all dollars
spent on federal campaigns during the 2016 election cycle,”
whereas spending made by presidential and congressional
candidates constituted a lesser thirty-six percent share combined.6
This phenomenon illustrates a seismic shift in American politics.7
The power and influence of the traditional campaign apparatus,
one that is permitted to raise and spend money solely for the

2

Although this Note will use the term “PAC” or “political action
committee,” neither formally exists under federal law. The federal
government formally recognizes and regulates “political committee[s],”
which is defined as any committee, club, association or other group of
persons that receives contributions in excess of $1000 or makes expenditures
in excess of $1000 in a calendar year to influence elections for federal office.
52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(A) (2018).
3
The “two most recent election cycles” refers to the 2018 midterm election
and the 2016 presidential election.
4
See Alexander, supra note 2.
5
Bloomberg’s analysis of campaign contributions categorized all PACs the
same, including super PACs permitted to take in unlimited donations. See id.
6
Alexander, supra note 2.
7
The 2016 general election was the second consecutive general election in
which the expenditures of Political Action Committees accounted for the
largest share of spending, when compared to the campaign spending of
“Presidential Candidates,” “Congressional Candidates,” and “Party
Committees.” Id. However, the 2016 election was the first on record in
which PACs raised and spent more than “Presidential Candidates” and
“Congressional Candidates” combined. Id.
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benefit of a specific candidate, has waned when compared to PACs
that are lawfully raising and spending money to influence the
outcome of multiple elections at once.8
This is not necessarily an alarming phenomenon. PACs
serve a unique and often beneficial role in American democracy—
they provide citizens who feel strongly about a particular political
issue or platform the opportunity to donate to organizations that
will spend their donations towards get-out-the-vote efforts; voter
registration drives; and even candidates who, if victorious, will
govern in accordance with the committees’ values. In essence,
PACs can serve as a vehicle to amplify the voices of citizens.
For example, the Tea Party Patriots PAC, with donations
from the general public, amplifies the voices of private citizens
who advocate for limited government and fiscal responsibility.9
Similarly, the Vote Climate U.S. PAC speaks on behalf of citizens
who are concerned about the state of the environment and want to
elect candidates who will vote for legislation to regulate carbon
emissions.10 Both of these organizations, among thousands of

8

See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(A) (2018).
TEA PARTY PATRIOTS PAC, https://www.teapartypatriots.org/ourvision/
(last visited Apr. 6, 2019).
10
VOTE CLIMATE U.S. PAC, https://voteclimatepac.org/vote-climatemission-and-approach/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2019).
9
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others, make it easier for citizens to exercise their constitutional
rights to engage in civic discourse.11
For all the benefits that PACs provide Americans, there still
exists one tremendous problem that calls into question existing
state and federal campaign finance laws: under the current
legislative schemes enacted by Congress and most state
legislatures, PACs are permitted to donate funds to other PACs.12
This may sound well and good, for it is certainly possible that
PACs wish to share funds with other likeminded committees to
jumpstart certain initiatives. However, legislative schemes that
permit PAC to PAC donations but restrict how much a citizen may
donate to a candidate campaign create what this Note calls the
“Political Action Committee Loophole.” This loophole, albeit
difficult to exploit, allows sophisticated citizens to conceivably use
PACs as a vehicle to circumvent campaign finance laws that
prohibit how much a citizen may donate to any single campaign
on an annual basis. This loophole will be discussed in greater detail
in Part III of this Note. In brief, under a statutory scheme where
PAC to PAC donations are legal, but citizens may not donate

11

The right to engage in civic discourse is encapsulated by the rights to free
speech, assembly, and association. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/PACs_and_Super_PACs (last
visited Jan. 6, 2020); see also OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacfaq.php (last visited Jan. 6, 2020).
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more than a specified amount to a PAC or campaign, a wealthy
donor could conceivably funnel his or her donations through
multiple PACs for the sole benefit of one PAC, one candidate’s
campaign apparatus, or both.13 This would allow the sophisticated
donor to not only exceed statutory contribution limits for a
donation to a PAC or campaign in a given election cycle, but to
also shield his or her contribution(s) from the public.
Recognizing that existing loopholes may allow certain
donors and PACs to assert undue influence in federal elections,
multiple state legislatures have appropriately responded by
prohibiting PACs from making certain expenditures to other
PACs. For example, both the Alabama and Missouri legislatures
enacted prohibitions on PAC to PAC donations, ridding most
PACs of the ability to donate monies they have on hand to other
likeminded PACs.14

13

A hypothetical example of this practice is presented in Part III of this
Note.
14
Missouri’s prohibition took form of a constitutional amendment. MO.
CONST. art. 8, § 23. Although the amendment was formally approved by the
voters of the state, it was initially introduced in the legislature as
“Amendment 2.” Jason Rosenbaum, Amendment 2 Could Bring Campaign
Donation Limits Back to Missouri, ST. LOUIS PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/amendment-2-could-bring-campaigndonation-limits-back-missouri#stream/0. On the other hand, Alabama
placed a probation on PAC-to-PAC donations by means of a statute. ALA.
CODE § 17–5–15(b) (2018).
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The motivation behind these two legislative actions was
reasonable: (1) to prevent sophisticated donors from being able to
influence elections by circumventing proper protocols involving
contribution limits and disclosure and (2) to prevent PACs from
coordinating with candidate campaigns and party committees.
Both Alabama and Missouri’s legislative actions were challenged
in federal court by PACs on the basis that they violated the First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association.15 The
ensuing litigation resulted in a circuit split between the Eight and
Eleventh Circuits on the same question: are prohibitions on PAC
to PAC donations constitutional under the First Amendment?16
This Note seeks to explore how the recent circuit split
between the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits fits into the existing
framework of First Amendment jurisprudence and to subsequently
weigh the constitutionality of prohibitions on PAC to PAC
donations. The implications of this circuit split can only be fully
understood with an understanding of the relationship between the
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association,

15

Ala. Democratic Conference v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 838 F.3d 1057, 1060
(11th Cir. 2016); Free & Fair Elections Fund v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 903
F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2018).
16
Alabama’s statute survived its constitutional challenge, Ala. Democratic
Conf., 838 F.3d 1057, 1058, whereas Missouri’s constitutional amendment
did not, Free & Fair Elections Fund, 903 F.3d 759, 762.
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America’s campaign finance laws, and the United States Supreme
Court’s foundational case law interpreting them.17
The analysis will proceed in five parts. Part I provides a
background on the First Amendment’s protection for the freedom
of speech and right to associate and explains how these
constitutional rights are implicated by campaign finance law. Part
II introduces the two central tenets of campaign finance law and
surveys the foundational case law on campaign finance to provide
a legal backdrop under which to properly analyze the two recent
cases at issue: Alabama Democratic Conference. v. Attorney General of
Alabama18 and Free & Fair Elections Fund v. Missouri Ethics
Commission.19 Part III further argues this Note’s position: placing
prohibitions on PAC to PAC donations is a reasonable policy but,
in light of recent Supreme Court precedent, likely does not serve a
legitimate state interest as a matter of law. Part IV analyzes the two
circuit courts’ decisions in question within the appropriate legal
framework. Part V examines, and criticizes, how the current
campaign finance case law restricts a state’s ability to be proactive
when trying to stop corruption before it happens and will discuss

17

See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
838 F.3d 1057 (11th Cir. 2016).
19
903 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2018).
18
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the implications of this circuit split on the upcoming 2020 general
election.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
The First Amendment to the Constitution20 is a “cluster of
distinct but related rights[.]”21 Particularly relevant to this
discussion involving campaign finance laws is the First
Amendment rights of free speech and peaceful assembly, and the
implicit right of association. These rights are implicated whenever
the government enacts regulations limiting the extent to which any
citizen may express themselves politically or limiting any citizen’s
ability to associate with a certain political group.22
A. The Right to Free Speech and the Protection of Political Expression
The “[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates” are firmly within the purview of First
Amendment protection.23 In light of the Framers’ motivations for
drafting the First Amendment, expressions of political speech are
considered to be “integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution.”24 It follows that

20

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455,
484 (1983).
22
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13–17 (1976).
23
Id. at 14.
24
Id.
21
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“[t]he First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such
political expression in order to assure the unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people.”25
There exists “practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of [the First Amendment] was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs,” which includes the
“discussions of candidates.”26 The U.S. Supreme Court in Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy27 even went so far as to declare “the constitutional
guarantee [of free speech] has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office,” conveying that political expression is considered
fundamentally important within the context of the right to free
speech.28 This powerful assertion directly implicates the rights of
PACs advancing the interests of their donors in the public forum
by independently buttressing the campaigns of certain candidates
or advocating for certain issues.
B. The Right to Peacefully Assemble and the Right to Freely Associate

25

Id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
27
401 U.S. 265 (1971).
28
Id. at 272.
26
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With the exception of speech, the right of citizens to freely
assemble29 is the “most widely and commonly practiced action that
is enumerated in the Bill of Rights.”30 To understand how
campaign finance laws implicate the freedom of association, it is
first important to discuss the origin of the specifically enumerated
First Amendment protection for peaceful assembly, as these rights
are intrinsically related.
The Assembly Clause was inspired31 by the impact colonial
taverns and “tavern talk”32 had on the revolution33 against the
British Crown.34 These taverns played a vital role as hubs of
colonial assembling. Baylen Linnekin explains that these taverns
were the “most common and important situs for building a
consensus for American opposition to the British:”35
Taverns were the only colonial space outside the home that
permitted participants in all social classes the opportunity
29

U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the
right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .”).
30
Baylen J. Linnekin, “Tavern Talk” and the Origins of the Assembly Clause:
Tracing the First Amendment’s Assembly Clause Back to Its Roots in Colonial
Taverns, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593, 593 (2012).
31
It is important to understand the Framers’ reasons for protecting the right
to peacefully assemble in the First Amendment, as it provides a logical
framework to better understand how the right to peacefully assemble and the
right to freely associate are related.
32
Linnekin, supra note 31 at 595.
33
Id. at 598 (“As the years passed, informal discussions continued alongside
more formal meetings as colonists began to explore the machinations of
revolution.”).
34
Id. (“In the British view, the homeland was merely asking prospering
colonists to repay their protectors.”).
35
Id. at 599.
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to decide whether, how, and to what extent they would
participate and shape their interactions with others. It was
in these informal community cells that colonists found the
most egalitarian context for gatherings. . . . Taverns
fostered a deep sense of community and offered the perfect
milieu for political debate. In this way, taverns served as
political spaces where citizens could participate in civic
life.36
For instance, some of the most influential Founding Fathers,
including George Washington, Patrick Henry, and Thomas
Jefferson, chose to assemble at taverns as they plotted against the
British.37 It is unsurprising, then, that American assertions of a
right to peacefully assemble were not just included in the Bill of
Rights but also in several State constitutions before the U.S.
Constitution was ratified in 1787.38
Although the First Amendment explicitly protects the right
to peacefully assemble with fellow citizens, it does not include any
direct language that protects the rights of Americans to freely
associate with whichever group(s) or political party they may
choose to join. Even though both these rights are inherently
related—they both permit citizens to join together with likeminded
individuals

36

to

effect

change—the

constitutional

right

Id. at 603-04 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 605 (stating that Founding Fathers planned successful boycotts after
assembling at colonial taverns).
38
See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1876) (“The right of
the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed long before the
adoption of the Constitution of the United States.”).
37

of
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association39 was not formally recognized until 1958.40 The U.S.
Supreme Court formally recognized the right of association after
acknowledging that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is
undeniably enhanced by group association,”41 thereby making it
an essential aspect of First Amendment protections.
Most relevant to this Note’s discussion of campaign
finance, however, are the Court’s subsequent decisions that
determined that the right of association goes so far as to protect the
ability “to associate with others for the common advancement of
political beliefs and ideas,” which includes “[t]he right to associate
with the political party of one’s choice.”42 Therefore, one’s
freedom to freely associate is the constitutional right most often
implicated by legislation regulating campaign finance because
these laws regulate the extent to which one can support a specific
candidate’s campaign, party committee, or PAC.
II. THE CENTRAL TENETS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

39

AND

Campaign finance provisions often implicate this right. See infra notes 45–
54.
40
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
41
Id.
42
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973).
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The modern campaign finance framework is a “muddled
mixture of legislative reforms” and Supreme Court decisions that
limit the impact of those laws.43 Even though campaign finance
regulations have changed significantly over the past forty years,
the two central tenets of campaign finance law—contribution
limits and disclosure thresholds—remain the same.44
The modern regulatory framework policing campaign
finance is largely based upon the structure originally enacted as
part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”),45
even though the act has been reformed by Congress on multiple
occasions and successfully challenged at the Supreme Court.46
The first significant Congressional reform to FECA was
passed in 1974, just two years after President Richard Nixon

43

Paul J. Weeks, Note, Enhancing Responsiveness and Alleviating Gridlock:
Pragmatic Steps to Balance Campaign Finance Law in Light of the Supreme Court’s
Jurisprudence, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2015).
44
See Anthony Johnstone, Recalibrating Campaign Finance Law, 32 YALE L. &
POL’Y. REV. 217, 228-30 (2013).
45
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972).
46
Weeks, supra note 44, at 1104 (stating that Congress made some small
changes to FECA before making more substantial reforms to the law in
2002). The most recent overhaul of FECA occurred in 2002 with the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). Id. at 1106. Although there have
not been any major reforms to the BCRA since 2002, the FEC “puts forth
new rules attempting to effectuate the Court’s decisions” that deem certain
provisions unconstitutional. Id. at 1104.
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originally signed it into law.47 The 1974 reforms to FECA48 placed
more stringent restrictions on campaign finance, including
codifying contribution limits for individuals wishing to donate to
campaigns and placing spending limits on individuals or groups
(PACs) that decide to independently support or oppose a
candidate.49 At the time, the statutory individual contribution limit
to campaigns was set at $1000 for individuals and $5000 for
political committees (PACs), per campaign.50
Furthermore, the codified spending limits imposed by the
amendments were rather severe. Individuals or organized groups,
such as PACs, were only allowed to independently spend $1,000
in support of or in opposition to particular candidates.51 The
legislative history surrounding FECA indicates that Congress was
focused on enacting campaign finance reform to address both
actual corruption and the appearance of corruption, which it
“believ[ed] ecompass[ed] both undue influence and unequal
access.”52 The provisions of this reform bill were ultimately
47

Id.
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
49
Weeks, supra note 44, at 1105.
50
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, supra note 49.
Furthermore, individual contributors could not donate more than $25,000
annually to political campaigns. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976).
51
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, supra note 49.
52
Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank J. Soraf, Evaluating the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA), 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 121, 123 (2003)
48
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challenged in federal court by various candidates for federal office
and associated political parties and organizations.53
A. Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
Buckley v. Valeo54 is the foundational case in the Supreme
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence. This decision was
particularly noteworthy for two reasons: First, it “introduced
corruption as a concern with weight enough to allow limiting First
Amendment freedoms.”55 Second, the Court developed a
balancing framework, still in use today, to determine whether a
particular campaign finance regulation is constitutional. In this
decision, the Court held that FECA’s contribution provisions56
were constitutional, but that the independent expenditure

(explaining that the Members of Congress who passed FECA in 1979 and
the BCRA in 2002 had a similar definition of the word “corruption”).
Although Congress did not closely define what “undue influence” and
“unequal access” meant in real terms, as the term corruption is “a technical
term of political science” that has remained the same since the Founding
Era, as evidenced by Framers’ overwhelming concern that corruption would
ultimately destroy any chance that the United States would ever flourish.
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341,
346–350, 373 (2009). In fact, “[c]orruption was discussed more often the in
the Constitutional Convention than factions, violence, and instability,” and
“was a topic of concern on almost a quarter of the days that the members [of
the Constitutional Congress] convened.” Id. at 352.
53
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
54
Id.
55
Teachout, supra note 53.
56
At the time, the contributions to candidates for federal office were limited
to $1000 from individuals and $5000 from political committees. Weeks,
supra note 45, at 1104-05.
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provisions violated the First Amendment.57 The holding of this
case was rather clear: it “creat[ed] a dichotomy between
contribution limits (generally permissible) and expenditure limits
(generally impermissible).”58
When making its decision to uphold the statutory limits
placed on individual campaign contributions and large donations
made directly to political committees (now more commonly
referred to as PACs), the Court adopted a balancing framework.59
This framework balances the First Amendment interest of citizens
to freely associate against the government’s interest to combat
actual or apparent corruption.60 On one hand, the Court
recognized that FECA’s statutory limitations on campaign
contributions “impose[d] direct quantity restrictions on political
communication and association by persons, groups, candidates,

57

The term “independent expenditures” refers to fiscal outlays any person or
political organization, such as a PAC, makes in support of a candidate
without coordinating with the campaign. For instance, if a citizen and their
family wished to create elaborate signs on behalf of President Donald J.
Trump when he visited their town on a campaign stop, the monies spent by
the family in creating these signs would constitute independent
expenditures, as they were not made in coordination with the campaign.
Statutory limits on such independent expenditure were deemed
unconstitutional by the Buckley Court, as discussed in the subsequent
paragraphs. Weeks, supra note 44, at 1104-05.
58
Marc E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, After McCutcheon, 127 HARVARD L.
REV. F. 373, 374 (2014).
59
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35–36, 38.
60
See id.
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and political parties,”61 thereby regulating the extent to which one
can associate with a specific candidate or campaign. However, the
Court also recognized that the federal government had an interest
in regulating one’s right to freely associate—by means of monetary
donations to a campaign or PAC—in order to prevent actual
corruption, or even the appearance of corruption.62
Even though the Court properly described the substantial
First Amendment interest at issue, the Court nonetheless
dismissed the appellants’ argument that the $1000 individual
contribution limit was “unrealistically low because much more
than that amount would still not be enough to enable an
unscrupulous contributor to exercise improper influence over a
candidate or office holder, especially in campaigns for statewide or
national office.”63
In response to the appellants’ claim that FECA’s
contribution limits were entirely arbitrary and did not actually
serve the purpose of rooting out actual or apparent corruption,64

61

Id. at 18.
Weeks, supra note 45, at 1105.
63
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.
64
The non-government appellants contended that the contribution limits
were not narrowly tailored enough to serve the government’s stated purpose:
to stop quid pro quo corruption, or even the appearance of it. They argued
that bribery laws and the disclosure requirements enumerated in FECA
“constitute[d] a less restrictive means of dealing with proven and suspected
62
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the Court reasoned that certain restrictions on political donations
were constitutional because the federal government had a rather
significant

interest65

“in

preventing

actual

and

apparent

corruption—specifically the danger, or even the appearance, of
quid pro quo corruption.”66 This interest, the Court concluded,
was paramount and outweighed the individual interest to freely
donate, without limits, to campaigns and political committees. 67
On its face this decision was reasonable. After all, the
Framers were rightfully concerned that corruption would
ultimately overwhelm the American Republic as it did Rome, and
thus ensured “[t]he Constitution carrie[d] with it an anticorruption principle.”68 With this in mind, it would appear that the
Buckley Court’s decision properly reflected the Framers’ intent, and
thus is rightfully considered “a seminal case.”69

quid pro quo arrangements.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28 (emphasis added)
(quotations omitted).
65
The Court described this interest as “weighty.” Id. at 29.
66
Weeks, supra note 44, at 1105.
67
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29. The Court noted that the contributions
limits enumerated in FECA “still provided substantial opportunities to
engage in politically expressive activity and to associate with candidates and
political committees.” Weeks, supra note 44, at 1105.
68
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341,
342 (2009).
69
See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 485 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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Legal theorists often refer to this case as the “original
campaign finance decision,”70 as it was the first instance in which
the Court formally held that Congress may adopt certain
contribution limits to control how citizens may associate with
political campaigns or PACs.71 Here, the Court accepted the
federal government’s assertion that it was necessary for Congress
to enact contribution ceilings, in conjunction with disclosure
requirements, to fulfill the government’s stated interest:
And while disclosure requirements serve the many salutary
purposes discussed elsewhere in this opinion, Congress was
surely entitled to conclude that disclosure [requirements
were] only a partial measure, and that contribution ceilings
were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the
reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system
permitting unlimited financial contributions, even when
the identities of the contributors . . . are fully disclosed.72
Nonetheless, the Court in Buckley also held that there are some
limits to the regulations Congress may enact. For instance, the
Court found that the government lacks a substantial interest in
limiting independent expenditures of these entities because they
are ultimately made without coordination with either the
candidate or their campaign; in other words, there is a decreased

70

Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for
Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1036 (2005).
71
See id.
72
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. In other words, the Supreme Court concluded that
the Congressional action was narrowly tailored to fit the government’s
interest.
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chance of quid pro quo corruption, or the appearance of such
malfeasance.73 The Court reasoned that, on balance, “independent
expenditure limits were unconstitutional based on this lack of
governmental interest coupled with the increased interference with
the First Amendment right to political expression that limitations
on independent expenditures pose.”74
As noted by Paul J. Weeks and other astute legal
commentators, the Buckley Court altered FECA “in a manner that
undermined the overall regulatory scheme” initially enacted by
Congress.75 In the years following Buckley, however, the Supreme
Court, under Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, published
decisions that “subtly expanded” the “permissible grounds” for
campaign finance regulation by Congress and state legislatures.76
In fact, the Rehnquist Court consistently upheld legislative
schemes regulating campaign finance “under increasingly
expansive conceptions of the government interest in preventing
actual and apparent corruption.”77

73

Id. at 45–47.
Weeks, supra note 44, at 1105.
75
Id.; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1710–11 (1999).
76
Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 243 (2010); See
e.g. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
77
Kang, supra note 77, at 248.
74
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For example, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,78
the Court expanded the government’s interest in preventing actual
and apparent corruption when it upheld regulations of campaign
finance aimed at mitigating “the corrosive effects of corporate
money.”79 In 2003, the Rehnquist Court yet again deferred to the
government’s interest in preventing actual and apparent
corruption in McConnell v. FEC,80 where it upheld portions of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”)81 that were
aimed at preventing “improper influence and opportunities for
abuse that extended beyond the usual concern about quid pro quo
arrangements.”82
The Rhenquist Court’s deference to the governmental
interest in preventing apparent or actual corruption has been
completely reversed in recent years by the Roberts Court. Citizens
United v. FEC83 and McCutcheon v. FEC84 serve as profound
examples for how the modern Supreme Court, moving
increasingly in a conservative direction, determines whether pieces

78

494 U.S. 652, 668–69 (1990).
Kang, supra note 77, at 248.
80
540 U.S. at 188–89.
81
The BCRA, signed into law in 2002, was the most significant piece of
campaign reform adopted by Congress since FECA. See Jonathan S. Krasno
& Frank J. Sorauf, Evaluating the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 121, 121–23 (2003).
82
Kang, supra note 77, at 248.
83
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
84
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
79
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of campaign finance legislation enacted by Congress and state
legislatures are constitutional. A brief discussion of the doctrinal
impact of these two cases is necessary to lay the groundwork for a
proper analysis of the central question of this Note—are state
campaign finance regulations prohibiting PAC to PAC donations
constitutional under the First Amendment?
B. Citizens United v. FEC85 (2010)
Citizens United invalidated “federal prohibitions on
independent corporate expenditures in connection with federal
elections,”86 holding that there was no constitutional basis “for
allowing the [g]overnment to limit corporate independent
expenditures.”87 While the Court’s holding did not speak to the
constitutionality of PAC to PAC donations, as they were not at
issue in the case, this landmark decision is entirely relevant when
analyzing the constitutionality of any campaign finance
regulation. This particular decision illustrates the Roberts Court’s

85

Political pundits and candidates for federal office often refer to Citizens
United in a negative light to make a broader point about the need for further
campaign finance reform. See e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, After Citizens United, a
Vicious Cycle of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/opinion/citizens-unitedcorruption-pacs.html.
This Note, however, takes no position on the merits of this particular
Supreme Court decision. It aims to properly apply this decision, in
conjunction with its other precedent, to analyze the circuit split between the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits at issue.
86
Kang, supra note 77, at 244.
87
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
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substantial winnowing of the legitimate government interest in
campaign finance regulation—preventing actual corruption or the
appearance of corruption—to actual or apparent quid pro quo
corruption, thereby making it more difficult for the government to
prevail when restricting speech in campaigns.88
The Court relied mainly upon the majority’s opinion in
Buckley v. Valeo to explain its rationale deeming federal
prohibitions on independent expenditures by corporations
unconstitutional.89 It reaffirmed that government has no interest in
limiting independent expenditures, whether it be by individuals or
corporations, and explained that the impact of the prohibition in
question extended well beyond preventing quid pro quo
corruption:
Limits on individual expenditures, such as § 441b, have a
chilling effect extending well beyond the Government’s
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. The
anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the
speech here in question. Indeed, 26 States do not restrict
independent expenditures by for-profit corporations. The

88

Kang, supra note 77, at 243 (“Citizens United, reflecting Justice Kennedy’s
views previously expressed mainly in dissent, represents the Roberts Court’s
clear reversal of [the Rehnquist Court] trend and a narrow focus on quid pro
quo corruption as the exclusive grounds for government regulation.”).
89
Id. at 246.
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Government does not claim that these expenditures have
corrupted the political process in those States.90
Here, the Roberts Court strayed significantly from relatively recent
precedent that had been incredibly deferential to the government,
in which campaign finance regulations were upheld so long as the
regulation(s) in question could conceivably limit corruption or the
appearance of it.91 By concluding that the government regulation
in question was unconstitutional because it went further than the
“Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption,”
the Roberts Court provided a new framework to determine if a
particular campaign finance regulation can overcome a First
Amendment challenge: whether the particular regulation in
question is narrowly tailored to prevent actual or apparent quid pro
quo corruption.92
C. McCutcheon v. FEC (2014)
In McCutcheon,93 the Supreme Court invalidated the
congressional enactment of “biennial aggregate limits,” which
limited the total amount of money any citizen may contribute to
PACs, federal candidates, or party committees (e.g. the

90

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 357; see also Kang, supra note 77, at 246.
See Kang, supra note 77, at 246–47.
92
See id. at 249 (asserting that Justice Kennedy’s majority decision, which is
“focused narrowly on the prevention of quid pro quo corruption” are “likely
[to] direct the Court’s campaign finance decisions going forward”).
93
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
91
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Republican National Committee and Democratic National
Committee) over a two year period.94 The conservative plurality
consisting of Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito,
affirmed what Justice Kennedy wrote in his majority opinion in
Citizen’s United: the government may only enact campaign finance
regulations “that regulate against the threat of actual or apparent
quid pro quo corruption.”95 Quid pro quo corruption, as defined
by Chief Justice Roberts, “captures the notion of a direct exchange
of an official act for money.”96 On the other hand, under the
dissent’s view, written by Justice Breyer, the definition of
corruption should be much broader and include “efforts to obtain
influence over or access to elected official[s] or political parties” in
order to “maintain the integrity of our public governmental
institutions.”97 If the definition were made broader, then, the
government would be able to more strictly regulate campaign
contributions.
Even though a plurality defined corruption much more
narrowly than their diseenting colleagues,98 the Court chose not to
94

Elias & Berkon, supra note 60, at 374.
Id. at 373.
96
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 192 (citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S.
257, 266 (1991)).
97
Id. at 234, 236. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)).
98
Justice Thomas filed his own opinion concurring in judgement only.
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 228. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that
95
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overturn the longstanding federal campaign regulations related to
individual campaign contributions.99 Originally upheld in Buckley,
those regulations limit how much an individual citizen may donate
to a particular candidate or PAC during an election cycle. Here,
the plurality, led by Justice Scalia, reasserted that provisions
limiting an individual’s First Amendment right to freely associate
through campaign contribution limits advanced the government’s
interest to prevent actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption and
were thus constitutional.100 This portion of the Court’s holding is
central101 to this Note’s discussion of the constitutionality of state

although Buckley was properly applied in this case, it should be overturned
completely. Id. at 232 (“I would overrule Buckley and subject the aggregate
limits in BCRA to strict scrutiny, which they would surely fail”). Here,
Justice Thomas continues to advocate that all campaign contribution limits
are unconstitutional. See id. (“I am convinced that under traditional strict
scrutiny, broad prophylactic caps on both spending and giving in the
political process . . . are unconstitutional.”) (quoting Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 640-41 (1996) (Thomas J.,
concurring).
99
Today, a citizen may donate a maximum of $2600 to any candidate each
year, $5000 to any PAC each year, $10,000 to any state party each year, and
$32,400 to any national party each year. Elias & Berkon, supra note 59, at
377.
100
Id. at 373.
101
Because the Supreme Court deemed contribution limits to be
constitutionally permissible, citizens who wish to donate more than what
the federal contribution limits allow are unable to do so. In light of these
limits, certain states, have become concerned that some citizens, particularly
those with significant resources, may still nonetheless try to circumvent the
federal contribution limits by funneling money through multiple PACs to
their candidate of choice. Enacting prohibitions on PAC to PAC donations
could prevent citizens from being able to exploit a loophole to spend beyond
what is legally permissible.
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prohibitions on PAC to PAC donations at issue in both Alabama
Democratic Conference. v. Attorney General of Alabama102 and Free and
Fair Elections Fund v. Missouri Ethics Commission.103 While the Court
makes clear that certain campaign finance regulations can prevail
over the Supreme Court’s exacting scrutiny standard,104 this
standard has become difficult to overcome, particularly when a
case comes before the Roberts Court that is properly applying
longstanding precedent. Therefore, when Congress and state
legislatures across the nation enact further campaign finance
regulations, they should expect to face difficult legal challenges
over whether the provision is narrowly tailored enough to prevent
actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption. Of course, this is under
the assumption that the Court continues to properly apply Buckley
and Citizens United to the case before it.
III. STATE PROHIBITIONS ON PAC TO PAC DONATIONS
Every state in the United States has enacted its own
regulations that govern the financing of candidates seeking
statewide, local, and municipal office, regulating the conduct of
party committees and PACs operating in their respective

102

838 F.3d 1057 (11th Cir. 2016).
903 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2018).
104
Regulations that place limits on how much a citizen can spend to donate
to a particular campaign, PAC, or party committee are almost certainly
going to be upheld so long as the limits enacted are not extremely low.
103

2019]

CLOSING THE “PAC LOOPHOLE”

213

jurisdictions.105 In light of the fact that the federal government has
enacted individual limits on campaign contributions,106 state
legislatures have subsequently passed legislation to try to close
loopholes that could possibly be exploited by individuals or PACs
trying to circumvent contribution limits or other aspects of
campaign finance law. For instance, Alabama’s state legislature
identified possible problems with its campaign finance laws that
undermined the public trust, 107 thereby inspiring the passage of its
own “PAC to PAC transfer ban,” described below, in hopes of
quelling actual or apparent corruption.108
Similarly, the State of Missouri109 astutely identified a
potential loophole in which a wealthy citizen could feasibly

105

See, e.g., DAVID E. POISSON, LOBBYING, PACS, & CAMPAIGN FINANCE:
50 STATE HANDBOOK, Ch. 1 (2018).
106
See supra Sections II.A.–C.
107
See Ala. Democratic Conf. v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 838 F.3d 1057, 1070
(11th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging there was “ample evidence that, before the
law’s passage, PAC-to-PAC transfers were viewed by Alabama citizens as a
tool for concealing donor identity, thus creating the appearance that PACto-PAC transfers hide corrupt behavior.”).
108
Alabama’s campaign finance laws, which do “not limit the amount of
money a person, business or PAC may contribute directly to a candidate’s
campaign,” Ala. Democratic Conf., 838 F.3d at 1060, does not make Alabama
susceptible to Donor A’s hypothetical scheme described above. If Donor A
resided in Alabama, he or she could simply donate an unlimited amount of
funds to a candidate for statewide office legally. They would not have to
concoct a scheme by which he or she funnels money through multiple PACs
in order to exceed contribution limits.
109
The Missouri Ethics Commission, the government entity responsible for
investigating “alleged violations of laws pertaining to campaign finance and
enforces those laws,” believed that a ban on PAC to PAC transfers were
required in order to prevent a donor from being able to evade the individual

214

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

circumvent federal campaign contribution limits:110 funneling
money through various PACs that would then contribute all of
the donated funds by the individual to a certain campaign, PAC,
or party committee of the individual’s choice. For example, a
hypothetical donor (“Donor A”) could donate $5,000 to ten
PACs and then direct each of these organizations to then transfer
$5,000 to a PAC or principal campaign committee of Donor A’s
choosing. Under this scheme, Donor A would effectively be
donating $50,000 to an independent PAC or campaign
committee of his or her choosing, well in excess of what is
permitted by federal law and Missouri state law. Thus, in hopes
of closing the loophole that would otherwise make Donor A’s
hypothetical behavior legal, Missouri adopted its own
constitutional amendment, discussed below, to place a
prohibition on PAC to PAC transfers. Even though Missouri’s
constitutional amendment and Alabama’s statutory provision
each had different aims, both barred the same activity. These

contribution limit. Free & Fair Election Fund v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 903
F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2018).
110
The individual contribution limit in Missouri is $2600 per candidate. MO.
CONST. art. VIII, § 23.3(1)(a).
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state actions were challenged in federal court on constitutional
grounds, as discussed in Part IV of this Note.
A. Alabama’s Fair Campaign Practices Act
Alabama’s Fair Campaign Practices Act (“FCPA”)
contains all of the campaign finance requirements for Alabama’s
state elections.111 In 2010, Alabama’s state legislature made
changes to FCPA that made it “unlawful for any political action
committee . . . to make a contribution, expenditure, or any other
transfer of funds to any other political action committee.”112
Under this statutory scheme, the Alabama legislature
carved out a single exception to this prohibition on PAC to PAC
monetary transfers, permitting PACs that are not principal
campaign committees113 to “make contributions, expenditures, or
other transfers of funds to a principal campaign committee.”114
This, however, is a very narrow exception as it still prohibits the
vast majority of PACs, “set up to give money to several
candidates,” from “mak[ing] a contribution or expenditure to
another PAC that is doing the same thing.”115
111

See ALA. CODE §§ 17–5–1 to –21 (2018).
Ala. Democratic Conf., 838 F.3d, at 1060 (citing to ALA. CODE § 17–5–
15(b)).
113
Principal campaign committees are PACs that are set up to support a
single candidate. These PACs often make “independent expenditures” on
behalf of a single candidate.
114
Id.
115
Id.
112
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B. The Amendment to the Missouri State Constitution
On November 8, 2016, Missouri voters approved an
amendment to the Missouri Constitution that added several new
provisions related to campaign finance.116 The clause that formally
places a prohibition on PAC to PAC donations states: “Political
action

committees . . . shall

be

prohibited

from

receiving

contributions from other political action committees.”117 The
amendment also defines “political action committees” as “a
committee of continuing existence which is not formed, controlled
or directed by a candidate, and is a committee other than a
candidate committee, political party committee, campaign
committee . . . whose primary or incidental purpose is to receive
contributions or make expenditures to influence or attempt to
influence the action of voters.”118 Here, like the statute crafted by
the Alabama legislature, Missouri’s constitutional prohibition on
PAC to PAC transfers of donations restricts the ability of PACs
not controlled by candidates or created for the sole benefit of
116

The provisions were formally added to the Missouri Constitution under
Article VIII. MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 23. See Jason Rosenbaum, Amendment
2 Could Bring Campaign Donation Limits Back to Missouri, ST. LOUIS PUBLIC
RADIO (Oct. 14, 2016) https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/amendment-2could-bring-campaign-donation-limits-back-missouri#stream/0; Benjamin
Peters, Co-ops Ask for Restraining Order in Campaign Finance Lawsuit, MO.
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2016), https://themissouritimes.com/36355/co-ops-askrestraining-order-campaign-finance-lawsuit/.
117
MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 23.3(12).
118
Id. at § 23.7(20).
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supporting one candidate from giving funds to other similar PACs.
This prohibition, which ultimately impacts the vast majority of
PACs, was a major point of contention in the lawsuit alleging this
provision violates the First Amendment.
C. The Constitutionality of Prohibiting PAC to PAC Donations in Light
of the Roberts Court’s Rulings in Citizens United and McCutcheon
Closing the “Political Action Committee Loophole” that
allows sophisticated donors to use PACs as a vehicle to evade
campaign contribution limits is a sound policy initiative.119
However, the Roberts Court would likely deem any state law that
bans PAC to PAC donations to be unconstitutional, unless the
state could show, with definitive proof, that the loophole has
previously been exploited, thereby showing actual or apparent
quid pro quo corruption.
As previously discussed, the Roberts Court is significantly
less deferential to state campaign finance regulations, when
compared to the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.120 Although the
Roberts Court has continued to uphold Buckley’s framework to
determine the constitutionality of a provision that regulates

119

This loophole only applies in states that have campaign contribution
limits, as most do, and at the federal level, which has had campaign
contribution limits since 1974. Weeks, supra note 44, at 1104.
120
See Kang, supra note 77, at 246–247, 249; Elias & Berkon, supra note 59,
at 373.
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campaign finance, the Court has effectively changed its test that
determines whether a legitimate state interest is present—it will
uphold only those laws that root out “actual or apparent quid pro
quo corruption.”121 Therefore, under this strict application of the
Buckley rule, a state must be able to show that a prohibition on PAC
to PAC donations will serve to stop “actual or apparent quid pro
quo corruption.”122 In order to do this, a state must be able to
provide “real-world examples of circumvention of . . . [its]
hypothetical.”123 In other words, a state must show that citizens in
the state—or perhaps citizens in another similarly situated state—
were previously exploiting this loophole before it enacted the
regulation. Considering it is hard to prove whether a citizen has
actually exploited this loophole to donate to a campaign more than
what is permitted,124 it is almost certain that the U.S. Supreme
Court would find a law banning PAC to PAC donations to be

121

See Kang, supra note 77, at 249.
See id.
123
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 217 (2014).
124
Once a donor donates money to several PACs, which then ultimately
donate to a single candidate campaign, it becomes very difficult to prove
that the donations to the candidate campaign were part of a coordinated
effort concocted by the initial donor.
122

2019]

CLOSING THE “PAC LOOPHOLE”

219

unconstitutional as a matter of law, as it could not meet the
increasingly higher standard for a legitimate state interest.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT BETWEEN THE EIGHTH AND ELEVENTH
CIRCUITS
The Supreme Court’s foundational case law on campaign
finance—Buckley, Citizens United, and McCutcheon—provides an
analytical framework to determine whether a particular state’s
campaign finance regulation is constitutional.125 In 2016 and 2018,
the Eighth and Eleventh Circuit, respectively, addressed precisely
the same question: whether a ban on PAC to PAC donations is
constitutional under the First Amendment. Even though both
cases were heard after the Supreme Court issued its most recent
opinion on campaign finance in McCutcheon, the courts ruled
differently, creating a circuit split, which has led to uncertainty in
campaign finance law. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that Alabama’s statutory ban on PAC to PAC donations was
constitutional. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and
determined that Missouri’s amendment was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment as a matter of law. Although both

125

See, e.g., Free & Fair Election Fund v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 903 F.3d 759,
763 (8th Cir. 2018) (applying the Supreme Court’s exacting scrutiny test, as
applied in McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 197).
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courts cited to the foundational case law,126 neither the Eighth nor
Eleventh Circuit properly applied the more recent case law that is
significantly less deferential to governmental regulation of
campaign finance—at least when compared to the foundations laid
by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. In comparing the two
decisions, the Eighth Circuit most properly applied the exacting
scrutiny standard from McCutcheon, thereby making it the most
reflective of how the Supreme Court would likely rule on this
matter.
A. Alabama Democratic Conference v. Attorney General of
Alabama (2016)
After the Alabama legislature passed new provisions to the
FCPA effectively banning PAC to PAC donations,127 the Alabama
Democratic Conference (“ADC”), a registered PAC in the State of
Alabama,128 brought forth a legal challenge to Alabama Code
§ 17–5–15(b).129 At the time of this lawsuit, the ADC was “the
largest grassroots political organization in Alabama” and it relied

126

See supra Part II.
Alabama’s FCPA referred to PAC to PAC donations as “PAC-to-PAC
transfers” but there is no distinction between the two names. ALA. CODE §
17-5-15(b) (2018).
128
The ADC’s mission is to “communicate with black voters in Alabama
and [to] encourage[e] them to support candidates for public office that the
organization believes would best represent their interest.”
128
Ala. Democratic Conf. v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 838 F.3d 1057, 1059 (11th
Cir. 2016).
129
See id.
127
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heavily upon other progressive PACs and the state Democratic
Party apparatus to fund its involvement in state elections.130
Therefore, the new, updated provisions of the FCPA banning PAC
to PAC donations greatly threatened the ADC’s ability to remain
“actively involved in elections in Alabama.”131
In response to the legislature’s decision to pass a statute that
restricted some of its major funding sources, the ADC decided to
restructure its contribution system, creating two separate bank
accounts: one account was created for the purpose of donating
campaign contributions to candidates, per the statutory limits, and
the other account was created for ADC’s independent
expenditures.132 In July of 2011, ADC sued the State of Alabama
in Federal District Court on the basis that the PAC to PAC transfer
ban violated its right “to make independent expenditures.”133
Ultimately, the district court held that Alabama’s prohibition on
PAC to PAC donations was constitutional as applied to the
ADC.134
In its ruling, which was ultimately upheld by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, the court reasoned that current Supreme

130

Id.
Id.
132
See supra Section II.B.
133
Ala. Democratic Conf., 838 F.3d at 1060–1061.
134
Id. at 1061.
131
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Court precedent aligned with the State of Alabama’s interests.135
However, the lower court seemed to apply the more permissive
Buckley standard, stating that “the only sufficiently important
interest that will support the PAC to PAC transfer ban is
preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.”136 By
applying the more permissive standard from Buckley, the court
essentially disregarded the majority opinion in Citizens United that
seemed to have considerably narrowed the permissible state
interest to simply preventing actual or apparent quid pro quo
corruption.137 After identifying the improper rule, the district court
ultimately reasoned that ADC’s organizational structure,138 which
failed to have “any other internal controls to safeguard against the
risk that contributions, even if formally earmarked for independent
expenditures, could be funnelled [sic] to a candidate” gave rise to
the appearance of corruption; thus, the state’s statute was
sufficiently tailored to stop corruption.139

135

Id. at 1062.
Id. (emphasis added).
137
Kang, supra note 77, at 249 (asserting that Justice Kennedy’s majority
decision in Citizens United “focused narrowly on the prevention of quid pro
quo corruption,” not the general appearance of corruption).
138
Even though the ADC established two separate accounts for campaign
activities it failed two separate groups operating these accounts. Ala.
Democratic Conf., 838 F.3d at 1061.
139
Id. at 1062.
136
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On appeal, the ADC made a narrow argument as it related
to PAC to PAC donations and independent expenditures, arguing
“the State [did] not have a sufficiently important interest in
banning PAC to PAC transfers used only for independent
expenditures.”140 It also argued that “the PAC-to-PAC transfer ban
does not actually promote any state interest” and that “the law is
not sufficiently closely drawn to protect the State’s purported
interests.”141 These arguments ultimately failed.
Like the district court in this matter, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals did not properly apply the Court’s recent
precedent in Citizens United, which more narrowly defined the
state’s interest to restrict campaign finances to actual or apparent
quid pro quo corruption.142 Even though the court cited to
McCutcheon, which stated that “Congress may regulate campaign
contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of
corruption,”143 the Eleventh Circuit did not take into account that
the ultimate holding of the opinion: the government may only
enact campaign finance regulations that “regulate against the
threat of actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption.”144 Rather,

140

Id. at 1063.
Id.
142
See Kang, supra note 77, at 249.
143
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185,191 (2014).
144
Elias & Berkon, supra note 59, at 373-74.
141

224

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

the Eleventh Circuit applied something resembling the Rehnquist
Court’s much more permissive standard to the state defendant,
asserting that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating
campaign finance even if there is merely the appearance of quid
pro quo corruption.145 This allowed the court to side with the state
of Alabama when it asserted that its prohibition on PAC to PAC
donations did serve the legitimate state interest of rooting out the
appearance of corruption.146
Next, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed ADC’s argument that
Alabama’s prohibition on PAC to PAC donations “[did] not
sufficiently serve the State’s interest in preventing quid pro quo
corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.”147 On
this point, the ADC argued that because Citizens United established
that “the State no longer has a cognizable corruption-based interest

145

Ala. Democratic Conf., 838 F.3d at 1064 (citing to FEC v. Nat’l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985), which
held, like Buckley, that “preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus
far identified for restricting campaign finances”).
146
See id. at 1065 n.1 (“The District Court noted a series of newspaper
articles and testimony by the State highlighting that, before the PAC-to-PAC
transfer ban, the appearance in Alabama was that donors were attempting to
conceal donations to candidates and other groups by laundering said
donations through multiple PACs. Donors were able to conceal these
donations by making a contribution to one PAC, which in turn made a
contribution to another PAC, which then made a contribution to yet another
PAC and so on, such that by the time the money was delivered to a
candidate there was no way to effectively trace the contribution from the
original donor to the ultimate recipient . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)).
147
Id. at 1065.
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in restricting independent expenditures . . . that the State has no
anti-corruption interest in regulating contributions into the
account that the ADC uses only for independent expenditures.”148
In

essence,

ADC

claimed

that

Alabama’s

statute

was

unconstitutional as applied to its organization, which had two
separate bank accounts to delineate the funds being used for
independent expenditures and funds being given directly to
campaigns.
In response to this argument, the Eleventh Circuit claimed
that a state’s interest in preventing corruption “may no longer
justify regulating independent expenditures when there is no other
form of contribution to or coordination with a candidate
involved.”149 However, ADC was actively coordinating with other
candidate campaigns, albeit from a separate bank account. Based
upon this fact, the court properly reasoned that case law from other
circuits,150

148

which

“uniformly

invalidated

laws

limiting

Id.
Id. at 1066. Here, the court properly applied the rule from Citizens United,
as it held that independent expenditures did not lead to, or create the
appearance of, quid pro quo corruption. 558 U.S. at 360 (“By definition, an
independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is
not coordinated with a candidate.”).
150
See, e.g., Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1096–97 (10th
Cir. 2013) (“If an entity can fund unlimited political speech on its own
without raising the threat of corruption, no threat arises from contributions
that create the fund.”); N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483,
487 (2nd Cir. 2013); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
149
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contributions to PACs that made only independent expenditures”
did not apply to this particular situation.151 Therefore, the court
concluded,152 that Alabama had a valid corruption interest to
regulate in this matter due to the fact that the ADC did not “do
more than merely establish separate bank accounts for candidate
contributions and independent expenditures.” In explaining its
rationale, the court wrote:
There must be safeguards to be sure that the funds
raised for making independent expenditures are
really used only for that purpose. There must be
adequate account-management procedures to
guarantee that no money contributed to the
organization for the purpose of independent
expenditures will ever be placed in the wrong
account or used to contribute to a candidate.153
There is no issue with the court’s reasoning that ADC did
not put in place reasonable safeguards to shield it from Alabama’s
law. After all, the facts on the record were rather damning to

151

Ala. Democratic Conf., 838 F.3d at 1066.
Here, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Second and Fifth Circuits, which
held that states had a legitimate interest in regulating hybrid PACs that
possess separate bank accounts for independent expenditures and candidate
campaigns when there are not adequate safeguards in place to ensure there is
no comingling of funds. See Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758
F.3d 118, 143 (2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that having a separate bank
account for independent expenditures does not alleviate anti-corruption
concerns when the organization in question also maintained an “otherwise
indistinguishable” account to spend money on candidate campaigns); See
Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 443 (5th Cir.
2014) (holding that a state had a sufficient anti-corruption interest in
ensuring that a contribution was used only for independent expenditures).
153
Ala. Democratic Conf., 838 F.3d at 1068.
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ADC’s case.154 However, the Eleventh Circuit failed to properly
apply the most recent Supreme Court precedent, Citizens United
and McCutcheon. Thus, it should not have been sufficient that the
Alabama legislature provided evidence on the record that the
public simply believed PACs were being used as a vehicle to
exploit the “Political Action Committee Loophole.” Rather,
Alabama should have been required to provide evidence of actual
or apparent quid pro quo corruption to justify its regulation.
The Roberts Court has demonstrated that when a state
seeks to regulate campaign finance, the Court must look for
evidence of actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption in order to
sufficiently meet the threshold for a legitimate state interest.155 If
this case proceeded to the Supreme Court, Alabama would have
difficulty winning as it would be unable to show, based upon the
facts currently on the record, that there was widespread actual or
apparent quid pro quo corruption ongoing between PACs and
sophisticated citizens in its state. Therefore, based upon the less
deferential standard the Roberts Court had established in Citizens

154

See id. at 1069 (explaining that “ADC did not offer[] any evidence to
indicate that it has implemented any other internal controls to safeguard”
and that ADC’s two accounts were “controlled by the same entity and
people”) (internal quotations omitted).
155
See Kang, supra note 77, at 246–247, 249; See Elias & Berkon, supra note
59, at 373.
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United and affirmed in McCutcheon, the Court would likely hold
that Alabama did not have a legitimate state interest, as a matter
of law, to enact a prohibition on PAC to PAC donations.156
B. Free & Fair Election Fund v. Missouri Ethics Commission (2018)
Soon after Missouri’s constitutional amendment banning
PAC to PAC donations went into effect, two PACs—Free and
Fair Election Fund (“FFEF”) and the Association of Missouri
Election Cooperatives Political Action Committee (“AMECPAC”)—sued to enjoin enforcement of the § 23.3(12) ban on PAC
to PAC donations.157 Similar to the ADC in Alabama, FFEF
“receive[d] contributions and [made] independent expenditures to
influence voters.”158 FFEF also alleged in its complaint “that it
desired to accept contributions from other PACs and to contribute
to those PACs that make only independent expenditures.”159 In
other words, FFEF claimed that it had no interest it soliciting
donations from other PACs and then using those funds to donate

156

Although this Note contends that the policy of closing the potential
Political Action Committee loophole by means of a prohibition on PAC to
PAC donations is entirely reasonable, the Roberts Court has been
increasingly less deferential to states seeking to regulate campaign finance
without evidence suggesting of actual or apparent corruption. However,
there is the possibility that there are five votes on the Court to revert back to
the previous permissive standard, as the Court has two new members since
Citizens United and McCutcheon.
157
Free & Fair Elections Fund v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n., 903 F.3d 759, 762
(8th Cir. 2018).
158
Id.
159
Id.
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to candidates. Like FFEF, AMEC-PAC also alleged in its
complaint that it desired to accept contributions from other PACs
and also donate to other PACs.160 Both jointly sued the State of
Missouri in federal court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,
“alleging

that

the

ban

on

PAC-to-PAC

transfers

was

unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, and unconstitutional as applied to each [of the
PACs].”161
The district court concluded that Missouri’s ban on PAC to
PAC donations “was unconstitutional on its face under the First
Amendment and unconstitutional as applied to FFEF.”162 When
reviewing the district court’s finding, the Eight Circuit Court of
Appeals began its opinion by properly stating that McCutcheon’s
“exacting scrutiny” standard applies, because a ban on PAC to
PAC donations regulates political contributions.163 However, the
Eighth Circuit went on to cite the Supreme Court’s rule in
McCutcheon that “preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption” is the only legitimate state interest to justify regulating
campaign finance.164 As previously discussed, even though the

160

See id.
Id. at 763.
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Id.
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See id. (emphasis added).
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Roberts Court in McCutcheon initially phrased its standard in the
same way as the more permissive Burger and Rehnquist Courts,165
it effectively required a clear showing of actual or apparent quid
pro quo corruption to justify its regulation.166 Therefore, to
determine whether the Eighth Circuit properly followed the
Supreme Court’s precedent, a further inquiry into the court’s
rationale is required.
The Eighth Circuit held that Missouri did not demonstrate
“a substantial risk that unearmarked PAC to PAC contributions
will give rise to quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.”167
Although the Missouri Commission reasonably asserted that
“without the ban on PAC-to-PAC transfers, a donor could evade
the [state’s] individual contribution limits of $2600 per candidate”
by “contribut[ing] large, unearmarked sums of money to a
candidate by laundering it through a series of PACs that he

165

The Burger and Rehnquist Courts permitted states to regulate campaign
contributions by merely citing to a showing that there was the general
appearance of corruption. See e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985) (“[P]reventing corruption or
the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling
government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.”).
166
See Elias & Berkon, supra note 59, at 373 (explaining the conservative
plurality consisting of Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, affirmed
what Justice Kennedy wrote in his majority opinion in Citizen’s United: the
government may only enact campaign finance regulations “that regulate
against the threat of actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption.”).
167
See Free & Fair Elections Fund v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 903 F.3d 759,
764 (8th Cir. 2018) (emphasis omitted).
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controls,” the court still found that “the transfer ban . . . does little,
if anything, to further the objective of preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption.”168 This was a strict ruling, especially
considering the court defined a legitimate state interest as
“further[ing] the objective of preventing corruption.”169 Under this
seemingly permissive standard, it would have been reasonable for
the court to find Missouri was fulfilling its legitimate state interest
by trying to close a loophole in its election laws.
What ultimately doomed the Missouri constitutional
amendment was that Missouri was neither able to “point to
evidence of any occasions before the amendment where PAC to
PAC transfers led to the circumvention of contribution limits” nor
“identify any donors who have exceeded contribution limits by
using transfers among a network of coordinated PACs.”170 In other
words, because Missouri simply sought to close a loophole that
had not been exploited yet, the court found that the regulation did
not meet the standard of a legitimate state interest. This seems to
suggest that the Eighth Circuit, like the Roberts Court, interpreted
the seemingly deferential rule established in Buckley, and affirmed
in Citizens United and McCutcheon, so narrowly as to effectively
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Id.
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Id.
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require a state to show actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption
before enacting the restriction. Under this reading of the rule, which
is likely the most reflective of how the Supreme Court would rule,
smart, reasonable policies to close the “political action committee
loophole” before it is exploited are likely to be deemed
unconstitutional as a matter of law.
V. A BRIEF CRITICISM OF MODERN CAMPAIGN FINANCE CASE
LAW
As previously discussed,171 it is likely that the Roberts Court
would strike down any state’s prohibitions on PAC to PAC
donations. Although these policies are reasonable and close the
“Political Action Committee Loophole” that allows sophisticated
donors to use PACs as a vehicle to circumvent campaign
contribution limits, they would likely be unable to survive
constitutional muster. Why?
The Roberts Court in McCutcheon made clear that the state
must be able to “provide any real-world examples of
circumvention” of its stated policy in order to show that it has a
legitimate state interest in enacting the policy to begin with.172
Therefore, as a matter of law, a state seeking to be proactive and

171
172

See supra Part III.
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 217.
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close any loopholes in its existing campaign finance laws before
citizens exploit said loopholes would be unlikely to ever show a
legitimate state interest. This is a tremendous flaw in modern
campaign finance case law.
While it is generally a sound policy for legislatures to enact
legislation after recognizing a problem exists, it is tremendously
difficult for a state to definitively show that a sophisticated donor
is exploiting the law to evade contribution limits to justify
prohibitions on PAC to PAC donations.173 Therefore, even though
wealthy individuals may circumvent state and Congressional
regulations on contribution limits using PACs as their vehicles, the
government would likely struggle to show that the regulation,
albeit reasonable, serves a legitimate state interest.
In April 2019, the the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari
in Free and Fair Elections v. Missouri Ethics Commission.174 One could
take this as a signal that the Supreme Court agrees with the Eigth
Circuit’s treatment of the Court’s campaign finance law precedent.
However, the High Court also denied certiorari in the Alabama
case,175 suggesting their unwillingness to reconsider or clarify their
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See supra Part III.
Free and Fair Elections v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n.,903 F.3d 759 (8th Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 1601 (2019).
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Ala. Democratic Conference v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 838 F.3d 1057 (11th
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1837 (2017).
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previous contentious rulings. Accordingly, the “Political Action
Committee Loophole” is likely to remain a topic of discussion
during the 2020 election cycle, especially considering the growing
influence of PACs on American democracy176 and the growing
debate around campaign finance reform. One thing seems clear,
however: Regardless of how sound of a policy it may be to place
prohibitions on PAC to PAC donations, should this question come
before the Supreme Court, the Roberts Court will be unlikely hold
that prohibitions on such activity to be constitutional under First
Amendment case law.

176

Alexander, supra note 2.

